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INTRODUCTION
Corruption's influence in American politics is as old as the country itself, and
its role in the future of politics is guaranteed. As long as money is involved,
corruption is sure to follow. Likewise, where there is politics, money is sure to be
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close by. "There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money
and I can't remember what the second one is."'
Nothing demonstrates this point better than the Savings and Loan ("S&L") bail
out of the 1980s. Many Americans still vividly remember when every man,
woman, and child paid an extra $5,600 in taxes to cover the cost of the S&L bail
out. 2 The bail out was perhaps America's largest financial scandal ever.3 During
this period the S&L industry contributed "at least $11,699,499 in campaign
contributions to congressional candidates and political party committees, including
$6.3 million through PACs. ' '4 At the same time, Congress deregulated the industry
which allowed the S&Ls to invest in largely speculative, rather than less risk-
averse ventures.5 Charles H. Keating, Jr., the controlling officer of the Arizona-
based thrift organization Lincoln Savings & Loan Association, was involved in a
large portion of these risky multimillion dollar investments. 6 The deregulation of
the S&L industry was, in large part, due to Keating's ability to influence senators.7
Keating gained powerful influence over five U.S. senators because of his large
contributions to their political campaigns. 8 These senators then used their political
power to influence the deregulation of the industry. This same influence also
1. Helen Dewar, For Campaign Finance Reform, A Historically Uphill Fight, WASH.
POST, Oct. 7, 1997, at A5 (quoting nineteenth-century U.S. Senator Mark Hanna (R-Ohio)),
cited in Rep. Harold E. Ford, Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New Horizon for Campaign Finance
Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 307, 307 (2000).
2. SUZANNE M. COIL, CAMPAIGN FINANCING 69 (1994). Coil claims that some experts
estimated that the total cost of the bail out was as much as $1.4 trillion. Id. She also notes
that for such a price tag the government could have bought a house for every family in New
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, San Diego, Dallas, Phoenix, Detroit,
and twelve other cities. Id. Others have argued that "the clean-up bill for the S&L crisis [left
to] the American taxpayer, [was] an average cost of $3000 per taxpayer." Jamin B. Raskin &
John C. Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273,
303 (1993). Regardless of the disagreement of the exact cost, either estimation demonstrates
the enormous and unnecessary cost to the taxpayer.
3. MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1 (1990); see also Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes,
Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1126, 1139 (1994).
4. Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1139 (It's a Wonderful Life, Common Cause
News (Common Cause, Washington, D.C.), June 29, 1990, at 1 (on file with Columbia Law
Review)).
5. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 908 (D.D.C. 1990).
"Lincoln cut back drastically on its single-family mortgages and it began to make all kinds
of non-real estate investments. It made direct investments in equity securities and also
included 'high yield-high risk' bonds in its investment portfolio." Id.
6. See Investigation of Senator Alan Cranston: Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., 102-233 (1991) [hereinafter Keating Report]. For a detailed explanation of
Lincoln Savings and Keating's involvement in the S&L collapse, see generally Lincoln
Savings & Loan, 743 F. Supp. at 901.
7. See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1139. See generally Ronald M. Levin,
Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3
(1996) (noting that Keating's large contributions and undue influence may be the "ultimate.
[in] political corruption").
8. Keating raised more that $1.5 million for Senators Alan Cranston, Dennis DeConcini,
John Glenn, John McCain, and Donald Riegle. Levin, supra note 7, at 3.
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caused Congress to increase the federal deposit guarantee insurance from $40,000
to $100,000.9
Former Senator William Proxmire analogized the S&L lobbyists and members
of Congress to a game of baseball. He commented:
Imagine that you're watching a World Series baseball game. The
pitcher walks over to the umpire before the game begins. The pitcher
pulls a wad of $100 bills out of his pocket and counts out 100 of them,
$10,000, and hands the whole fat wad to the plate umpire. The umpire
jams the bills into his pocket, warmly thanks the pitcher and settles
down to call that same pitcher's balls and strikes.
10
The fans are left wondering what was going on. They had paid to watch a fairly
played baseball game, yet they are left to conclude that the game had been fixed. 1"
Like the baseball game, the lobbyists and members of Congress fixed the
political game. The dangerous investments made by the S&Ls ultimately failed,
leaving the taxpayer with the bill. The government was willing to take such huge
risks because of the corrupting influence of money in politics. Five senators "were
accused of improperly interfering in regulatory decisions in order to assist"
Keating. 12 Speaking of the scandal investigation, Keating said, "[o]ne question...
had to do with whether my financial support in any way influenced several political
figures to take up my cause. I want to say in the most forceful way I can: I certainly
hope so.'
13
The corrupting influence of secret offshore bank accounts, large campaign
contributions, quid pro quo, and buying exclusive access to politicians is seen as
the root of evil within the election process.14 These evils corrupt and undermine the
entire nature of democracy. "The payment of money to bias the judgment or sway
9. See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1139-40 (quoting 139 CONG. REc. S6678
(daily ed. May 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kerry)).
10. William Proxmire, Take the Pledge: No More Special Interest Money, ROLL CALL,
Sept. 17, 1990, at 5.
11. Id.
12. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH 62 (2001); see also Keating Report, supra note
6. Of the "Keating Five," the committee only formally reprimanded Senator Alan Cranston.
It found that his pattern of fundraising was impermissibly tied too closely to his official
activities. Id. at 20.
13. Terry Atlas, Scandal Builds Around Lincoln S&L, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1989, at
§ 7, pg. 7; Michael Kranish, Five Senators Who Aided S&L Face Queries on Contributions,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1989, at A12 (quoting Charles Keating).
14. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301 (1989) (claiming that money is the root of evil in
the political system). Lowenstein also looks at whether contributors actually get access to
politicians based upon their contributions. By looking carefully at the evidence, he rejects
many studies that attempt to prove that money does not buy political influence. Instead, he
argues that money does buy inappropriate influence. Id. at 313-22. Concluding that:
The legislative process is not corrupt, but it is tainted with corruption.
Legislators, by and large, are not corrupt. Neither are lobbyists. They
are doing what they must to carry out their roles in the system as it
presents itself to them. They are not corrupt, though sometimes they are
corrupted. The campaign finance system is corrupt.
Id. at 335. This corrupt campaign finance system is caused by improper influence of money.
Id.
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the loyalty of persons holding positions of public trust is a practice whose
condemnation is deeply rooted in our most ancient heritage."
1 5
As long as the corrupting influence of money survives, so too will the goal to
keep our "elections free from the [corrupting] power of money."' 6 Congress has
worked toward a corruption-free democracy by enacting an assortment of
regulations to prevent this undue influence from sabotaging or diminishing the
political process.
Congress's power to regulate the manner of elections comes from the Elections
Clause of Article I, Section 4.17 Its enumerated power to regulate is not, however,
limitless. Beginning in 1976, the Court restricted this power based upon First
Amendment concerns. When government regulations trespass protected First
Amendment rights, they can only be upheld by meeting the governmental interest
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.
In 2002, Congress exercised its power to regulate by passing sweeping
campaign finance legislation known as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 ("BCRA").' s Almost immediately after BCRA took effect, Senator Mitch
McConnell brought suit asking a special three-judge panel of the District Court for
the District of Columbia to find the law unconstitutional.' 9 He argued, inter alia,
that BCRA "tramples First Amendment rights., 20 In response, the Government
argued that Congress did have the authority to legislate because-even though
BCRA crossed into protected First Amendment activity--the legislation was
passed in an effort to drive corruption or the appearance of corruption from the
political process. Later, the District Court's decision was appealed directly to the
Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.2' The Court upheld
22the major provisions of BCRA by a 5-4 vote. The majority maintained that
corruption or the appearance of corruption justified any infringement upon the First
Amendment.23
With such a "strong affirmation of Congress's authority to regulate the flow of
money in politics," 24 some in Congress have begun to call for additional reforms.25
15. Id. at 302.
16. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957).
17. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4.
18. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 181 (2002).
19. Edward Walsh, Campaign Finance Hits First Legal Test; Judges to Hear Oral
Arguments, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2002, at Al. Senator McConnell was only one of the more
than eighty named Plaintiffs in the case which included well known organizations like the
Republican National Committee, the National Rifle Association, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the California Democratic Party. Neely Tucker &
Edward Walsh, Panel Stays Campaign Finance Ruling; McCain-Feingold Law Restored
Until Decision By Supreme Court, WASH. POST, May 20, 2003, at Al. Richard A. Oppel &
Neil A. Lewis, Campaign Law Set for Big Test In a Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at
Al.
20. Neely Tucker, Campaign Law Case Brings Debate, Crowds: McCain-Feingold Bill
Called Threat to Free Speech---and Key to Honest Elections, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at
A4.
21. 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
22. Id.
23. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, in a 5-To-4 Decision, Back Campaign Finance
Law that Curbs Contributions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at Al; Charles Lane, Justices
Uphold Campaign Finance Law; Court Endorses 'Soft Money' Ban, Rejecting Free-Speech
Concerns, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003, at Al.
24. Lane, supra note 23, at AO1.
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This Note argues that Congress's power to regulate elections is not unlimited.
McConnell does not grant any sort of unlimited power to Congress. Instead,
Congress may regulate so long as it follows a careful legislative strategy. This Note
discusses a plan under which future campaign finance regulations will be
successful and avoid constitutional problems.
To assist in understanding the best possible plan, Part I provides a brief history
of campaign financing regulations. Part II discusses the landmark case Buckley v.
26 poieValeo. Buckley provided the starting point for all campaign finance reform
analysis. This decision firmly entrenched First Amendment analysis into campaign
financing. Buckley also first developed the government interest of corruption or
the appearance of corruption as sufficient to justify abridging the First Amendment.
Part III then explores in greater detail the meaning of corruption or the appearance
of corruption as defined by the Court. To gain a better understanding of the Court's
definition, this Note looks at significant cases dealing with the justification. Part IV
offers a brief overview of how Congress used the justification of corruption to its
advantage when passing BCRA. Because Congress properly used the justification
the Court upheld BCRA in McConnell. Finally, Part V presents details for a
successful legislative strategy in the future. Two important aspects of the strategy
include remaining true to the Court's definition of corruption and compiling a
legislative record containing evidence of that corruption.28 This Note concludes by
arguing that if Congress uses the corruption justification properly, it will have the
power to pass future campaign finance laws without violating the Constitution.
I. CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF EARLY CAMPAIGN
FINANCING LAWS
President Theodore Roosevelt's first item of business on his 1906 agenda for
Congress was to prohibit contributions to federal candidates made by
25. Senator John McCain, Remarks at the Carnegie Corporation of New York (Jan. 26,
2004), at http://www.democracy21.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2004); see also Tom Gerety,
Statement on the Supreme Court's Ruling on Campaign Finance Reform, at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/bcra/bcravictory.html (stating that even after
McConnell, "[tihere are many more battles to wage in pursuit of a more open and inclusive
democracy") (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
26. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
27. Some scholars argue that the reasoning of money equaling speech is flawed. They
have attempted to show that the entire body of law is unworkable because money is not
really speech. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising:
Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1281, 1289 (1994) (discussing, in part, whether money really equals speech); J.
Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005
(1976).
28. Strong arguments have been made against why the Court should not use a type of
legislative record review. Indeed, "[riequiring the legislature to make findings supporting the
need for legislation likely strikes many as problematic." Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress
into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
731, 734 (1996). The intention of this Note is not to argue in favor of or against legislative
record review. Instead, it argues that just as the Court has used legislative record analysis in
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, so too has the Court begun to rely
upon it when reviewing campaign financing cases. Therefore, because the Court has chosen
to use this method of review, this Note offers a plan for Congress to follow when enacting
future campaign financing regulations.
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corporations. 29 In 1907, Congress responded to President Roosevelt by enacting the
Tillman Act.3 ° The Act provided, "[t]hat it shall be unlawful for any national bank,
or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a
money contribution in connection with any election to any political office." 31 In
1921, the Supreme Court handed down Newberry v. United States,2 a case that
invalidated federal regulation of Senate primary races. The Newberry decision
eventually led to a considerable revision of the current campaign laws, known as
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 ("FCPA"). 33 At the time, the astonishing
growth of organized labor during World War II concerned Congress because this
powerful force could begin to behave politically much like corporations.3 4 Thus, in
the Smith-Connally Act of 1943, 35 Congress extended the prohibition on campaign
contributions made by labor organizations for the duration of the war.
36
"Shortly thereafter [in 1947] Congress again acted to protect the political
process from what it deemed to be the corroding effect of money employed in
elections by aggregated power."37 Congress made FCPA permanent, the wartime
legislation, "proscrib[ing] any 'expenditure' as well as 'any contribution,' . . .
application to labor organizations and to extend its coverage to federal primaries
and nominating conventions. ' 38 This legislation became the Taft-Hartley Act of1947. 9
A. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
With John F. Kennedy running for president, the early 1960s brought about the
Kennedy era in American politics. Many of Kennedy's opponents argued that he
had an unfair advantage because his fami I was very wealthy and he was able to
use much of that wealth in his campaign. Furthermore, due to the rising cost of
elections and the more than ever prevalent influence of money, there began an
election reform movement that focused on ways that money was raised and spent in
elections.41 In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA").42 The new law set limitations on the amount of money that federal
candidates could personally contribute to their election campaigns, placed limits on
what could be spent on media advertising, and required candidates to completely
29. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957).
30. Id. at 578 (citing the Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907)).
31. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
32. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
33. UAW, 352 U.S. at 578 (citing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, 43
Stat. 1070 (1925)).
34. 57 Stat. 163, 167; see also UAW, 352 U.S. at 5.
35. Ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943) (terminated 1946).
36. UAW, 352 U.S. at 578 (citing the Smith-Connally Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68
(1943) (terminated 1946)).
37. Id. at 582.
38. Id. at 582-83 (quoting the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60 (1947)).
39. Id. The Taft-Hartley Act was eventually codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1946).
40. COIL, supra note 2, at 10.
41. See id. at 12.
42. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
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disclose to the public their campaign contributions and expenditures.43 FECA went
into effect on April 7, 1972. 44
Prior to the adoption of FECA, "the size and sources of candidate contributions
were not publicly disclosed, and there were no effective limits on the amount of
money that individuals or groups could contribute to federal campaigns. 45
However, knowing that the status quo would soon change-and that there would
no longer be an opportunity for undisclosed secret fundraising-many candidates
increased their efforts to raise large sums of money before the new law went into
effect.46 President Richard Nixon was among the candidates who engaged in this
eleventh-hour fundraising.47
Not long after FECA took effect, news of the Watergate scandal broke.a It was
eventually discovered that before FECA's April 7, 1972 deadline, the Nixon
fundraising machine had generated almost $20 million in unreported campaign
funds.4 9 Total contributions came to some $60.2 million.50 Much of the unreported
money was raised in the last forty-eight hours before the deadline.5 ' The
revelations showed that there had been more than $10 million in soon to be illegal
corporate contributions,52 including some $2 million solely from the dairy
industry.5 3 To avoid detection, a large portion of that money was collected in
cash.54 Howard Hughes gave one $100,000 contribution, which was stashed in a
safe deposit box.55
Other famous and blatantly corrupt uses of money were large donations used as
bribes. As reported by the New York Times, one of Amerada Hess Corporation's oil
refineries came under investigation by the Interior Department.5 6 Leon Hess,
chairman of Amerada Hess, made secret donations of more than $575,000 to the
campaigns of President Nixon and Senator Henry Jackson (chair of the Interior
43. COIL, supra note 2, at 12. For an in depth discussion of the significant provisions in
the 1971 FECA, see Anthony Corrado, Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, in
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 353-54 (L.
Sandy Maisel ed., 1991).
44. COIL, supra note 2, at 12.
45. ANTHONY CORRADO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 9 (2000).
46. COIL, supra note 2, at 12.
47. Id.
48. SMITH, supra note 12, at 31.
49. CoIL, supra note 2, at 13.
50. MONEY & POLITICS: CONTRIBUTIONS, CAMPAIGN ABUSES & THE LAW 35 (Lester A.
Sobel ed., 1974) [hereinafter MONEY & POLITIcs]. A report compiled by Common Cause
explained that the Nixon campaign had raised $11.4 million in secret contributions during
the four weeks before April 7, 1972. Id.
51. SMITH, supra note 12, at 31-32. This included a whopping $2.9 million on April 6,
1972. MONEY & POLITCS, supra note 50, at 35.
52. SMITH, supra note 12, at 31-32.
53. Id. at 32; see also COIL, supra note 2, at 13.
54. Some people who made cash donations, including singer Frank Sinatra, also divided
their contributions into $3000 payments in order to avoid paying taxes on the sum. See
MONEY & POLITICS, supra note 50, at 33.
55. COIL, supra note 2, at 13; see also MONEY & POLITICS, supra note 50, at 34.
56. Senate Panel Data Show Donor Hid Gifts to Jackson's '72 Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 1974, at 25.
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Committee).57 Shortly after making the contributions, the investigation into
Amerada Hess ceased.58
Many of these undisclosed contributions were used for illegal purposes. Two
Washington Post reporters, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, revealed a secret
bank account had been set up by President Nixon's Committee to Reelect the
President ("CRP").59 The secret account contained campaign contributions to CRP,
which included illegal corporate money laundered through a Mexico City bank.6°
Funds from the account were used to pay the men who had bugged and burglarized
Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate hotel-apartment
building.61
The Woodward and Bernstein revelation prompted Congress to direct the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") to audit CRP.6 The GAO audit uncovered
even more illegal transactions and apparent violations of campaign finance laws
than those originally reported by Woodward and Bernstein. 63 After congressional
and legal investigations, President Nixon finally released incriminating tape
recordings that showed that Nixon knew that the Watergate break-in had been paid
for with campaign funds.6 Furthermore, the tapes clearly proved the President had
directed the cover-up--once again paid for with illegal campaign funds. 65 Soon
thereafter Nixon resigned the Presidency, effective August 9, 1973.
6
B. 1974 FECA Amendments
During the investigation, and in response to the corrupt campaign finance
practices of CRP and President Nixon, Senators Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and
Hugh Scott (R-PA) put forth bills to amend the 1971 FECA to tighten the holes in
campaign laws.
67
Watergate 6 and the 1972 Nixon campaign revealed details of financial abuse
57. Id.
58. Ben A. Franklin, Miss Woods's Gift List Links Donors to Corporations, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1974, at 30.
59. ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 47 (1988); see also John W. Dean, H, Watergate: What Was It?,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 609 (2000) (discussing in detail what the Watergate scandal was, how it
happened, and who played the various roles in revealing the high level of corruption within
the Nixon administration).
60. MUTCH, supra note 59, at 47.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 49.
65. Id. at 48-49.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 49.
68. In his article, Watergate: What Was It?, John Dean attempts to define Watergate.
He cites two interesting definitions. Dean, I, supra note 59, at 645 n.101. First, Watergate
is defined as:
1. A political scandal during the 1972 presidential campaign, arising
from a break-in at the Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate
building complex in Washington, D.C. and culminating in the
resignation of President Nixon. 2. any scandal involving corruption and
other abuses of power, and attempt to conceal these activities from the
public.
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and corruption that raised serious concerns in the public mind and Congress about
the influence of money in politics. 69 Soon thereafter Congress amended the 1971
FECA with the 1974 FECA Amendments.70 The two versions of the amendments
were Senate Bill 304471 and House Bill 16,090. 72 The stated purpose of the Senate
Bill was to "provid[e] complete control over and disclosure of campaign
contributions and expenditures in campaigns for Federal elective office.,7  The
1974 FECA Amendments placed dollar limits on the amount individuals could
contribute 74 to candidates and political committees. 75 The amendments also limited
spending by candidates in federal elections.76 Finally, the amendments created a
system for disclosure requirements and also created the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") to ensure that candidates complied with the new record
keeping and disclosure rules.
7 7
II. MONEY AS SPEECH AND A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST:
BUCKLEY V. VALEO
In 1976 the Supreme Court handed down Buckley v. Valeo,78 the most
significant decision to date examining the limits on campaign financing. Several
politicians including Senator James L. Buckley of New York and Eugene
McCarthy, a presidential candidate and former Senator from Minnesota, 79 filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of the 1974 FECA Amendments. 8 0 Buckley dealt
with four major issues of FECA's amendments: (1) individual contribution and
expenditure limitations; (2) reporting and public disclosure of certain expenditures
and contributions; (3) public funding for presidential elections; and (4) the creation
Id. (quoting RANDOM HouSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1505 (1991)). The second
definition given is "[a] scandal that involves officials violating public or corporate trust
through perjury, bribery, and other acts of abuse of power in order to keep their elective or
appointive positions." Id. (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1366 (2d Coll. Ed.
1985) (alteration in original)).
69. For a discussion of how the events of Watergate lead to Congress amending FECA,
see HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION 591 (1976).
70. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93- 443, 88 Stat.
1263 (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972)).
71. S. 3044, 93d Cong. (1974), S. REP. No. 93-689 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5587.
72. H.R. 16,090, 93d Cong. (1974), H.R. REP. No. 93-1239 (1974).
73. S. REP. No. 93-689, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5587-88.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976) provided that "no person shall
make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office ...
exceed[ing] $1,000." Id. The statute also limited aggregate contributions by any one
individual to a total of $25,000. Id.
75. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1974).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976) provided that "no person may
make any expenditure relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year...
exceed[ing] $1,000."
77. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-34, 437 (1974).
78. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
79. Id. at 7-8 (describing various plaintiffs).
80. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 101,
202, 310, 403, 88 Stat. 1263-68, 1275, 1280, 1291 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431-56 (1994)).
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of the FEC.8' The challenge was directed, among other things, at various provisions
of the 1974 FECA Amendments restricting election spending.82 The 1974
Amendments had been designed to "purify and equalize federal elections, [by]
plac[ing] stringent limitations upon the amounts of money that individuals were
permitted to contribute and spend upon campaigns for federal office."83 When
examining these expenditure and contribution limits, the Court was required to
decide if the limitations violated the First Amendment Free Speech Clause. This
stemmed from the Court's recognition that campaign expenditures and
contributions work within "an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities. ' ' s4
First, the Court carved out a distinction between campaign expenditures and
campaign contributions. The Court found that limitations on expenditures
produced severe First Amendment concerns.8 6 "[V]irtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money."
87
The Court reasoned that even "[tjhe distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet
entails printing, paper, and circulation costs."88 The Court concluded that
expenditure limitations required the most "exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression. 89 To overcome
this heightened burden, the Government would have to show a substantial
governmental interest. 90 The interest asserted by the defenders of FECA-
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption-did not satisfy the
81. 424 U.S. at 7.
82. Id. at 11.
83. Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1050 (1985).
84. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. The Court found that the Free Speech test from United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that "a government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it... furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest"), was not the appropriate test because the "expenditure of money
simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card." Buckley, 424
U.S. at 16. The Court also refused to apply First Amendment principles from Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (reasoning that the government could adopt reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech), to campaign financing. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17-
18.
85. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20. The definition of a contribution is money given by a
donor that is completely turned over to a third party such as: a political party, candidate, or
political action committee. These are considered contributions because the donor does not
have any say as to how or when the money will be spent. The definition of an expenditure is
money that is spent on someone else's behalf, but is controlled directly by the spender. See
Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Restrictions on Campaign Finance Regulation, in CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 63 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997). Furthermore,
Congress said that an independent expenditure encompassed "sums expended on behalf of a
candidate without his authorization, as distinct from contributions of money, goods or
services put at the disposal of his campaign organization." S. REP. No. 93-689, 18 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5604.
86. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20.
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 44-45.
90. Id.
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exacting scrutiny on independent expenditures, 9' because the risk of corruption
resulting from an individual spending his own money was very low. The other
interest offered by the Government, "equalizing the relative ability of individuals
and groups to influence the outcome of elections," 92 was also not enough to
overcome strict scrutiny. It was not a valid interest because "equalizing" speech
was a concept "wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 93 Consequently, the Court
struck down all independent expenditure limitations as unconstitutional.
94
Next, Buckley addressed the question of limits on campaign contributions. 95
The Court upheld FECA's limit on contributions because they placed less
significant burdens on the protected freedoms of political expression and
96association. The Court said that limiting contributions "involves little direct
restraint on his political communication." 97 Buckley held that these protected
constitutional rights could be overcome. The test used by the Court was that,
"[e]ven a 'significant interference' with protected rights of political association
may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and
employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms."
98
The Government argued that three different interests acted to justify the limits
on contributions. The first and primary justification was the need to protect against
corruption and the appearance of corruption.99 The second was to reduce the
influence of the wealthy and equalize the political process for all participants.100
The final justification was to reduce the increasing cost of campaigns thus allowing
greater access to the political system to those without a lot of money.' 0' The Court
summarily dismissed the last two interests because the primary goal of protecting
against actual and perceived corruption was sufficient to allow some infringement
of First Amendment rights.'
0 2
Looking at corruption, the Court called attention to the potential for quid pro
quo between candidates and donors. The giving of large sums of money for
political favors had the potential to undermine the integrity of our democracy.0 In
an attempt to define corruption the Court simply noted that corruption is often
difficult to detect.'°4 The "deeply disturbing examples" from the 1972 election and
Watergate scandal, however, were sufficient proof of this kind of corruption. 15 The
Court did not cite any specific examples from the 1972 election or provide a clear
91. Id. at 45.
92. Id. at 48.
93. Id. at 49.
94. Id. at 51.
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976) for contribution limits.
96. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
97. Id. at 21.
98. Id. at 25 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975) (quotations
omitted) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) and Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
99. Id. at 25.
100. Id. at 25-26.
101. Id. at 26.
102. Id. at 26-29.
103. Id. at 27-28.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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definition of corruption. Instead, it merely addressed examples of corruption in a
footnote, citing the examples presented by the court of appeals. 106
In reaching its conclusions, the court of appeals relied upon a Senate report
from the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. 107 This Committee
investigated misconduct surrounding the 1972 presidential election.l0 8 The report
showed several major forms of actual quid pro quo corruption. First, there were
enormous contributions' °9 made to the Nixon campaign by the dairy industry. 0 In
return for the dairy industry's two million dollars, President Nixon overrode the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and instructed that price supports be
raised."' Second, the report found that the large contributions from individuals and
special interest groups were given to legislators as a means to secure special
access."12 As one person put it, the campaign contributions were essentially likened
to a "calling card, something that would get us in the door and make our point of
view heard."'"13 There were many other examples in the report that pointed to
instances of special favors made in return for large donations.' 4 Therefore, in
reliance on this evidence provided by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court said
that the problem of corruption was "not an illusory one,"" 5 and concluded that
there was a significant governmental interest to allow for regulation of campaign
contributions."
6
In summary, the Buckley decision made a distinction between campaign
expenditures and contributions. The Court held, among other things, that FECA's
restrictions on individual expenditures were unconstitutional. On the other hand,
the Court upheld FECA's limitations restricting the amount of money an individual
could contribute to a candidate based upon the significant interest of preventing
actual corruption or its appearance. In reaching its conclusion, the Court upheld
106. Id. at 27 n.28 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (1975 D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 424
U.S. 1 (1976)).
107. S. REP. No. 93-981 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 SENATE REPORT].
108. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840 n.35.
109. "[M]ilk producers, on legal advice... [and] consultation ... with Nixon fund
raisers.... br[oke] down the $2 million into numerous smaller contributions to hundreds of
committees in various states which could then hold the money for the President's reelection
campaign, so as to permit the producers to meet independent reporting requirements without
disclosure." Id. at 840 n.36.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 840 n.37.
113. Id.
114. Id. These examples also include giving sizeable contributions in order to be
considered for ambassadorships. Id. at 840 n.38.
115. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). The Appellants also attempted to argue
that even if the restrictions on contributions did serve a significant government interest, they
were not narrowly tailored and should fail strict scrutiny. Id. The Appellants urged the Court
to strike down the contribution limits in FECA because "bribery laws and narrowly drawn
disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means." Id. The Court was not
convinced. It simply held that the contribution limitations had identified a problem of
corruption and the limits were narrowly tailored enough to solve the problem in a way that
did not significantly undermine First Amendment rights. Id. at 28.
116. Id. The Court said that "Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance
of the appearance of improper influence is also critical ... if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent." Id. (quotations
omitted).
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much of FECA by focusing on the government interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption.
III. CLASSIFYING CORRUPTION: THE COURT CONSTRUCTS THE INTEREST
The Buckley decision revealed a workable framework based upon First
Amendment jurisprudence in which to analyze campaign financing. 17 That
decision was only the beginning, however, leaving many areas open to debate.
Many scholars argued that Buckley was unworkable, completely wrong, and should
be abandoned.' 18 Yet the Court built from the principles outlined in Buckley
making clear that the only recognized governmental interest sufficient to overcome
First Amendment scrutiny was actual corruption or the appearance of corruption.
Hence, for many years a debate followed over the meaning of corruption and just
how much was required to meet First Amendment scrutiny.119 In reference to
political corruption, Buckley noted that the "scope of such pernicious practices can
never be reliably ascertained."1 20 Indeed, it is difficult to say with any great
precision what constitutes corruption. Notwithstanding the challenge of defining
the governmental interest, the Court's campaign finance decisions following
Buckley began to shed some light upon the subject. Combining the doctrine from
these rulings reveals the various forms of corruption recognized by the Court. In an
effort to more fully develop the meaning of corruption, a look at the Court's
campaign finance decisions over the quarter century after Buckley aids in
ascertaining the scope of this interest.
A. The Court and Corruption-The First Ten Years After Buckley
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,121 was the first campaign finance
case decided after Buckley. In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts
statute which restricted the participation of banks and corporations in referendum
proposals. 22 The Court found that the restrictions violated a corporation's right to
free speech. 23 The Commonwealth argued that it had a compelling interest in
preventing corruption or perceived corruption because "corporations are wealthy
and powerful and their views may drown out other points of view."' 24 In its
analysis, the Court focused not on whether a corporation had a First Amendment
117. See generally BeVier, supra note 83.
118. See, e.g., E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL
STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 15-21 (1998); Ronald Dworkin, The Curse
of American Politics, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19-24.
119. See, e.g., Paul S. Edwards, Defining Political Corruption: The Supreme Court's
Role, 10 BYU J. PuB. L. 1 (1996); David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption:
Documenting the Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REv.
LITIG. 85 (1999); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45 (1997); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1369 (1994).
120. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
121. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
122. Id.
123. See generally id.
124. Id. at 789.
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right to free speech, but instead on whether the speech being restricted was the kind
of speech meant to be protected by the First Amendment. 2P The Court said,
It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,
and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation
rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of
its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of its source.'
26
The Court found that while preserving the integrity of the electoral process was
of high interest, 127 the risk of corruption was not present in this particular case
because it dealt with a public referendum election.' 28 Furthermore, the Court
refused to find a governmental interest in preventing corruption because the
Commonwealth failed to show in the "record or legislative findings that corporate
advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes" or that there
was a lack of "confidence of the citizenry in government." 129 The Bellotti decision
remained consistent with Buckley because while Congress may be able to show the
existence of real or perceived corruption through large expenditures and
contributions to candidates, the threat was not possible in this case because there
was no evidence of corporate corruption and no candidate to corrupt.1
30
Next, in 1982 the Court heard FEC v. National Right to Work Committee.'
3
'
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist addressed Congress's ability to regulate
corporations based on corruption in the federal election process. The Court upheld
the statute because "substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special
advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be
converted into political 'war chests' which could be used to incur political
125. Id. at 775-76.
126. Id. at 777.
127. Id. at 789.
128. Id. at 787-88 n.26.
129. Id. at 789-90.
130. Id. Justice White's dissent, an interesting side note from Bellotti, is noteworthy
because of its influence in Supreme Court precedent many years later. Justice White
expressed concern about corporations being able to "amass wealth as a result of special
advantages extended by the State for certain economic purposes from using that wealth to
acquire an unfair advantage in the political process." Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White was concerned about the special fundraising advantage because a
corporation's ability to gather this wealth is not related in any way to the public support of a
candidate or idea. Id. at 810. The raising of corporate funds happens through people
spending money based upon nonpolitical economic self-interested transactions. As a result,
such an unfair advantage and increased ability to raise money was troublesome because
large corporate expenditures and contributions could tremendously distort the political
process. But, as Justice White noted, the majority opinion did not find a need to address this
concern because, "there ha[d] been no showing that the relative voice of corporations ha[d]
been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts." Id. Yet it
was clear that the Court would eventually be required to answer this question. When it
finally did, much of the framework for the answers appears to have originated from the ideas
expressed by Justice White.
131. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
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debts."'' 32 In this case, instead of relying alone on quid pro quo corruption or the
appearance of corruption, the Court defined corruption as "political debts."'
133
During this early post-Buckley period, the Court did not thoroughly explain or
define corruption. This posed a problem for many lawyers and politicians. In an
effort to clear the fog, the Court endeavored to illuminate the definition of
corruption in FEC v. National Conservation Political Action Committee
("NCPA C"), 3 4 yet it never reached a strong resolution. The Court, with Justice
Rehnquist writing for the majority, defined corruption as: "A subversion of the
political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations
of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into
their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars
for political favors."' 135 Because quid pro quo was the hallmark of corruption, this
suggested that there were other forms of corruption that could act as significant
governmental interests. This definition left the door open for other types of
corruption such as amassing large amounts of wealth to acquire an unfair
advantage. Unfortunately, this issue was never answered in NCPAC. Justice
Rehnquist simply relied upon the Buckley framework that made distinctions
between expenditures and contributions and used the usual quid pro quo form of
corruption.
The Court upheld the district court's decision to exclude evidence provided by
the FEC to justify the regulations by showing actual corruption or perceived
corruption. 13 "[E]vidence of high-level appointments in the Reagan administration
of persons connected with [contributing] PACs and newspaper articles and polls
purportedly showing a public perception of corruption,"' 38 was excluded. The
Court held that "[a] tendency to demonstrate distrust of PACs is not sufficient.', 139
Therefore, NCPAC provides somewhat of a broader definition of corruption; yet to
come within that definition, greater proof than mere speculation of corruption is
required.
Next, the Court decided FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life ("MCFL") 140
in 1986. In MCFL, the Court addressed the issue of whether a federal ban on
campaign contributions violated the First Amendment.' 4' As applied to MCFL, the
Court found that § 441(b) of the FECA--that required corporations to make
independent expenditures only from a separate segregated fund-unconstitutionally
burdened the nonprofit organization's freedom of expression. 42 The Court first
found that the ban placed significant restrictions on free speech. 143 In order to
justify the ban, the Government needed to show a compelling state interest, which
the Court did not find. The FEC attempted to characterize the interest as one from
National Right to Work in the prevention of corruption in the corporate form.144
132. Id. at 208.
133. Id. at 208-11.
134. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
135. Id. at 497.
136. Id. at 497-99.
137. Id. at 499.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 263.
143. Id. at 251-56.
144. Id. at 256-57.
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However, the Court found that independent expenditures made by MCFL were
permissible because they were not similar to a corporation. In the Court's view, the
concern was not that the corporation itself was inherently evil, but that it could
amass large amounts of money unfairly. This unusual ability would lay the
groundwork for a corporation to become a monetary heavyweight and unfairly
influence the political process with its large amounts of wealth.' 4' In spite of this
apprehension, MCFL was not like a normal corporation, but instead was a
nonprofit organization. It did not amass capital through normal market incentives.
Rather, all of its funds were raised for one purpose-political communication.
Therefore, there was no concern about the corrupting effects of money in this
situation. 146
B. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,147 the Supreme Court upheld a
Michigan statute that prohibited corporations from making independent
expenditures citing the state's compelling governmental interest in preventing the
distorting effects of wealth on the political process.148 The Austin decision
implemented a new standard never before used in campaign finance First
Amendment case law. This new standard has been labeled by some as the "New
Corruption" test.
149
In Austin, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce ("Chamber") sought to make
an independent expenditure from its general treasury funds in support of an
individual candidate for the House of Representatives. 15 The statute made this type
of independent expenditure illegal and punishable as a felony, thus the Chamber
brought suit for an injunction. 151 The Chamber contended that even though it could
use its segregated political fund for campaign expenditures, 152 its First Amendment
right to free speech was still burdened because it was not free to use its general
treasury funds for campaign expenditures.' 53 Relying on MCFL, the Chamber
claimed that it too was a non-profit corporation and should be entitled to spend
money from its general fund on independent campaign expenditures. 154 The Court
agreed. It determined there was a significant burden which could only be overcome
by a compelling state interest.' 5
5
In response, the State argued that its goal of preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption provided a justifiable compelling state interest. In
examining the State's compelling interest, the Court agreed, articulating that it had
recognized that "the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption
145. Id. at 259 ("Regulation of corporate political activity thus has reflected concern not
about use of the corporate form per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of
wealth for political purposes." (emphasis in original)).
146. Id.
147. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 656.
151. Id.
152. The Chamber expected to raise some $140,000 in its segregated fund by election
time. Id. at 658.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through
the corporate form." 56 The Court found that this "different type of corruption in
the political arena,"' 57 can be recognized by two features. First, corruption can be
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth."'
58
Second, the wealth must have been "accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and . . . have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
corporation's political ideas."' 159 These definitions of corruption illustrate that the
Court was beginning to move beyond the mere quid pro quo definition of
corruption from Buckley to include within the definition the "corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth" that have a negative impact
upon the political process.160
The Court's decision did not determine whether a corporation's right to
freedom of speech was different from that of an individual. Rather, it subjected
corporations to a more exacting scrutiny because they enjoy "special advantages"
which could have a "corrosive and distorting effect." 16 Consequently, Austin's
ramifications in campaign finance cases are significant because it opens the door
for a new type of corruption including large "war chests" and, for the first time,
recognizes the possibility that independent expenditures can be restricted based
upon the governmental interest in preventing corruption.
C. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission ("Colorado ,,),162 the Court decided whether Congress could regulate
the amount of spending done by a political party on behalf of a candidate. In April
1986, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee ("Committee")
bought radio advertisements to attack then Congressman Tim Worth, a democrat
running for an open Senate seat. 163 Under FECA,' 64 the Committee was allowed to
spend only a limited amount of money in coordinated expenditures in the Senate
race.165 The Committee had previously given its entire spending allotment to the
National Republican Senatorial Committee. Upon purchasing the advertisements,
the State Democratic Party claimed the Committee had violated the law. 166 The
156. Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Conservation Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 500-01 (1985)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 660.
159. Id.
160. Schultz, supra note 119, at 130.
161. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
162. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). This case is referred to as Colorado I because it eventually
returned to the Supreme Court in 2001 (Colorado II) to decide issues left open in Colorado
L
163. Id. at 612.
164. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1974).
165. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 612. "Congress [has] acknowledged the unique role
political parties play in the election process by allowing parties to supplement any direct
contributions they make with expenditures made on behalf of individual candidates. These
funds, because they are spent in coordination with candidates, are known as 'coordinated
expenditures."' CORRADO, supra note 45, at 14 (emphasis in original).
166. Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 612.
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Committee defended the charge by asserting that "the Party Expenditure
Provision's expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment.' '
6 7
The Court concluded that the coordinated party expenditure limit was an
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment as applied. 168 In an attempt to
bring the activity within the scope of the recognized governmental interest in
preventing corruption, the FEC argued that the activity was a coordinated
expenditure. The Court was not persuaded, finding that the expenditure was
independent-not coordinated with an individual republican. 169 The evidence
showed that the "advertising campaign was developed by the Colorado Party
independently and not pursuant to any general or particular understanding with a
candidate."' v Because this was an independent expenditure, it fit within the
Buckley framework prohibiting Congress from regulating.'
7
'
Also significant, the Court reasoned that the evidence in the legislative record
revealed the Party Expenditure Provision was enacted "for the constitutionally
insufficient purpose of reducing what [Congress] saw as wasteful and excessive
campaign spending."' 72 The legislative record lacked any convincing evidence
connecting the purpose of the legislation to the interest in preventing corruption.
Therefore, the Court found that Congress had exceeded its legislative authority
because the Court "d[id] not believe that the risk of corruption present here could
justify the markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by the statute's
limitations on expenditures." 
7 3
D. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
Four years after Colorado I, the Court heard Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC.174 The Shrink Missouri case is important because it adds to the
understanding of the "appearance of corruption" standard. In 1994, the Missouri
Legislature passed a law that restricted the amount of contributions that could be
given to a candidate running for state office.175 Before the law went into effect, an
initiative was approved that included even more restrictive contribution limits. 176
Zev David Fredman, a candidate for state auditor, and Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, a political action committee, sought to enjoin enforcement of
the new law. 17 7 "[T]he Court of Appeals held that Missouri was bound to
demonstrate 'that it ha[d] a compelling interest and that the contribution limits at
167. Id.
168. id. at 613.
169. Id. at 614.
170. Id.
171. The Court said, "restrictions on independent expenditures significantly impair the
ability of individuals and groups to engage in direct political advocacy and 'represent
substantial . . . restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech."' Id. at 615
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)). Furthermore, restrictions on independent
expenditures do not raise to quid pro quo concerns about corruption because no favors are
traded for money when making independent expenditures. Id.
172. Id. at 618.
173. Id. at 617.
174. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
175. Id. at 382.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 383.
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issue [were] narrowly drawn to serve that interest.""178 Furthermore, the court of
appeals "treated Missouri's claim of a compelling interest in 'avoiding the
corruption or the perception of corruption brought about when candidates for
elective office accept large campaign contributions' as insufficient by itself to
satisfy strict scrutiny."' 179 The Supreme Court reversed.
The issue before the Court was whether Buckley's power to limit campaign
contributions applied to the States. 1 The Court upheld the Buckley decision and
found it applicable at the state level.' 8' In order to limit contributions, the State was
nevertheless still required to overcome First Amendment scrutiny by showing a
need to prevent corruption or its appearance.1 82 Missouri argued that the law had in
fact been passed with these concerns in mind.
83
The next question before the Court was whether the State had actually passed
the law in an effort to curb corruption. The Court looked for evidence of the two
forms of corruption discussed in Buckley. It found no evidence of quid pro quo
corruption, so for the first time the Court looked for "perceived corruption."'" The
Court expressed the vital need to keep the perception of corruption out of the
system in order to maintain a healthy democracy. 85 The Court noted that "[t]he
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the
justification raised."' 86 Furthermore, the evidence also had to be genuine and not
imaginary-the Court had never been willing to accept mere conjecture.' 87 The
Court found that Missouri carried its burden by providing an adequate amount of
evidence to justify its regulations. The evidence demonstrated that the people of
Missouri believed that there was corruption present in the state democracy.'8 8 This
decision was relatively simple as it did not require the Court to resolve what the
evidentiary burden should be.' 89 Thus, accepting the governmental interest in
preventing the appearance of corruption, and evidence supporting that conclusion,
the Court upheld Missouri's statute as constitutional.
E. Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee
In Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee ("Colorado 11"),19° the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
178. Id. at 384.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 381-82.
181. Id. at 382.
182. Id. at 388.
183. Id. at 390.
184. Id.; see also D. Bruce La Pierre, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Political
Parties, and the First Amendment: Lessons From Missouri, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1105
(2002) ("[Tlhe Court transformed the government's interest in preventing actual quid pro
quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption into a much broader... justification
[for] contribution limits.").
185. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 390.
186. Id. at 391.
187. Id. at 392.
188. Id. at 393-95.
189. Id. at 393.
190. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
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expenditures made by a political party, and coordinated with a candidate, could be
treated "functionally as contributions, the way coordinated expenditures by other
entities are treated.'.191 Unlike Colorado I, which was an as applied challenge to
limits on expenditures, Colorado I was a facial challenge to the limit on
coordinated party expenditures. 192 The Government argued that the coordinated
expenditures should be treated the same because they are "as useful to the
candidate as cash, and that such 'disguised contributions' might be given 'as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.""1 93 Consequently, the FEC
argued a coordinated expenditure is like a contribution-a comparison that
becomes apparent when individual contributors, having reached their maximum
contribution limit, donate more to a political party knowing that the party will
reciprocate by spending on their candidate's behalf. 194 Therefore, if coordinated
expenditures were not treated as contributions and restricted, this method of
circumvention would increase. 195
The Court was convinced by the Government's argument. The Court held that
coordinated party spending was the "functional equivalent" of contributions' 96 and
applied the same analysis to coordinated expenditures as it did to contributions.
This determination required that the level of scrutiny applicable to the limit be
"closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently important" interest. 197 Thus, the Court
looked for the only recognized sufficiently important governmental interest-the
prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption. It held that
"circumvention is a valid theory of corruption,"' 198 and that "a party's coordinated
expenditures .. .may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution
limits."'199 Accordingly, circumvention clearly emerged as a form of recognized
corruption.
F. Summary of the Recognized Formulas for Corruption
Even after all of these cases, "[t]he Court has never actually defined what it
means by 'corruption or the appearance of corruption. -200 However, while no solid
definition of corruption has been declared, several forms have emerged. The first
and perhaps easiest to identify is quid pro quo, or money for political favors, which
surfaced in Buckley. 201 NCPAC also recognized "dollars for political favors" and a
"subversion of the political process" as corruption. ° 2 In National Right to Work,
the Court acknowledged that corruption could exist in the form of corporations
191. Id. at 444.
192. Id. at 437.
193. Id. at 446 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)).
194. Id. at 447.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 456.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 465.
200. Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of
the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1729, 1741 (2001).
201. Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1179, 1188 (2002) (noting that Buckley's
focus was on quid pro quo corruption).
202. 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1984).
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amassing large amounts of wealth. 0 3 MCFL reinforced the ability to regulate direct
spending of corporate treasury funds for political purposes. With Austin, the Court
firmly fixed the broad definition of corrosive and distorting effects upon politics to
immense aggregations of wealth.20 4 Then in Shrink Missouri, the appearance of
corruption included public perception of irnproper influence on an office holder's
judgment coming from large contributions. 2° Finally, Colorado I and Colorado 11
dealt with coordinated expenditures. 206 These coordinated expenditures were struck
down to minimize the circumvention of other provisions of FECA. 207 As a result,
any of the aforementioned practices satisfy the definition of corruption.
IV. CORRUPT'ION'S CREATION: CONGRESS ACTS AND THE COURT RESPONDS
Since Buckley, corruption or its appearance in the political process has caused
extensive debate and much discussion about reform. Debate regarding the
restructuring of FECA was long and ongoing; resulting in literally hundreds of bills
proposed in Congress to reform campaign financing. 08 Many people shared their
203. 459 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982).
204. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, 660 (1990).
205. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394-95 (2000).
206. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 437.
207. Id. at 465; see also Eric L. Richards, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee: Implications for Parties, Corporate Political
Dialogue, and Campaign Finance Reform, 40 Am. Bus. L.J. 83, 116 (2002) (stating that
"Colorado II broadly recognized an interest in preventing circumvention of FECA's
individual contribution limits").
208. See, e.g., PAC Limitation Act of 2001, H.R. 2533, 107th Cong. (2001); Campaign
Reform and Citizen Participation Act of 2001, H.R. 2360, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. (2001); Equal Political Opportunity
Act of 2001, H.R. 2226, 107th Cong. (2001); Clean Money, Clean Elections Act, S. 719,
107th Cong. (2001); Citizen Leg. and Political Freedom Act, H.R. 1444, 107th Cong.
(2001); Common Sense Federal Election Reform Act of 2001, S. 602, 107th Cong. (2001);
Fed. Election Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 1080, 107th Cong. (2001); Open and Accountable
Campaign Financing Act of 2001, H.R. 1039, 107th Cong. (2001); Conduit Contribution
Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 1019, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001); Open and Accountable Campaign Financing Act of
2001, S. 22, 107th Cong. (2001); Fed. Elections Reform Act of 2001, S. 17, 107th Cong.
(2001); Campaign Fin. Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5596, 106th Cong. (2000); Open and
Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2000, S. 2941, 106th Cong. (2000); Campaign Fin.
Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 4685, 106th Cong. (2000); Accountability and Disclosure
Act of 2000, H.R. 4621, 106th Cong. (2000); Campaign Fin. Reform and Disclosure Act of
2000, S. 2565, 106th Cong. (2000); FEC Reform and Authorization Act of 2000, H.R. 4037,
106th Cong. (2000); Open and Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2000, H.R. 3243,
106th Cong. (1999); Citizens' Right to Know Act of 1999, S. 1751, 106th Cong. (1999);
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999, S. 1593, 106th Cong. (1999); PAC Limitation
Act of 1999, H.R. 2866, 106th Cong. (1999); Campaign Spending Control Act of 1999, S.
1502, 106th Cong. (1999); Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 2668,
106th Cong. (1999); Citizen Leg. and Political Freedom Act, H.R. 1922, 106th Cong.
(1999); Campaign Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 1867, 106th Cong. (1999); FEC Reform and
Authorization Act of 1999, H.R. 1818, 106th Cong. (1999); Fed. Election Law Integrity Act
of 1999, H.R. 1778, 106th Cong. (1999); Clean Money, Clean Elections Act, H.R. 1739,
106th Cong. (1999); Clean Money, Clean Elections Act, S. 982, 106th Cong. (1999); Cong.
Campaign and Admin. Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 1641, 106th Cong. (1999); Fed. Election
Enforcement and Disclosure Reform Act, S. 504, 106th Cong. (1999); Bipartisan Campaign
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concerns about corruption in the system. On a number of occasions, Senate
Minority Leader Tom Daschle expressed concern about a corrupt system. 2°9 He
stated that the "corrosive effect" of huge money contributions has ruined people's
210faith in government. 0 Senator McCain also noted that Americans believe the
system is corrupt.211 He cited a CNN/Time poll, which found 77 percent of
Americans "described the current way in which candidates for Federal office raise
money for campaigns as either 'corrupt' or 'unethical.' 21 2 This general feeling of
distrust finally prompted Congress to confront this perceived corruption by making
changes in campaign finance laws-the most sweeping since the early 1970s.
21 3
A. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
In March 2002, President Bush signed into law the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA").2 14 The law took effect November 6, 2002-the day
after the 2002 general election. The law addressed several perceived problems with
the campaign finance system. The most notable provision of BCRA is the ban on
soft-money found in Title I. Title I adds a new section to FECA, § 323(a), which
"[p]rohibits national party committees from soliciting, receiving, directing,
transferring, or spending soft money; generally prohibits spending of soft money
for a 'federal election activity' by state and local party committees, including an
association or group of state or local candidates or officials." 215 In summary, and
for all practical purposes, it eliminates the national parties' ability to receive or
spend soft-money.
Finance Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 417, 106th Cong. (1999); Advancing Truth and
Accountability in Campaign Communications Act, S. 79, 106th Cong. (1999); Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 1999, S. 26, 106th Cong. (1999); Congressional Election
Campaign Spending Limit and Reform Act of 1999, S. 16, 106th Cong. (1999); Voter
Empowerment Act of 1999, H.R. 32, 106th Cong. (1999).
This long list of bills barely scratches the surface and does not attempt to list all of the
bills introduced in years past. A more detailed list would include literally hundreds of bills.
There were at least 71 bills dealing with campaign funding introduced during the 107th
Congress, 77 bills during the 106th Congress, 146 during the 105th Congress, and 107 bills
introduced during the 104th Congress.
209. See 148 CONG. REc. S2110, 2110-11 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Daschle).
210. See id. at 2111.
211. Id. at 2107 (statement of Sen. McCain).
212. Id.
213. Briffault, supra note 201, at 1180.
214. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002); Statement on Signing Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 517-18 (Mar. 27, 2002);
Elisabeth Bumiller & Philip Shenon, President Signs Bill On Campaign Gifts; Begins Money
Tour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at Al.
215. L. Paige Whitaker, CRS ISSUE BRIEF IB98025, CAMPAIGN FINANCE:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOFr MONEY, Sept. 12, 2002, at 7, at
http://fpc.state.gov/document/organization/24057.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). A federal
election activity is defined as: (1) voter registration drives in the last 120 days before an
election; (2) get-out-the-vote activities in which a Federal candidate is on the ballot; (3)
public communications that refer to a clearly identified federal candidate and promote,
support, attack, or oppose a candidate for that office (regardless of whether they expressly
advocate a vote for or against); or (4) services by a state or local party employee who spends
at least 25% of paid time in a month on activities in connection with a federal election. 2
U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i)-(iv) (West Supp. 2003).
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The other provisions of BCRA are similarly important, yet in essence, they
simply help to reinforce the elimination of soft-money from the federal election216
system. Title II of BCRA prohibits corporations and labor unions from making
"electioneering communications."2t 7 These electioneering communications include
advertisements that refer to a clearly identified candidate running for federal office
within sixty days before a general election or thirty days before a primary
election. 21 8 This portion of Title II was designed to target what has become known
as "sham issue ads. '21 9 Title II also broadens disclosure requirements and makes
the filing and viewing of reports more user-friendly via the Internet.
220
Additionally, Title II prohibits any political party from making a coordinated
expenditure on behalf of a political candidate.22
Finally, Title III contains other miscellaneous provisions worth mentioning.
For example, Title III increases the limit on hard money contributions by
individuals from $1000 to $2000 per candidate per election. It also strengthens
223the ban on foreign money contributions. Furthermore, it contains the extremely
complex "millionaire provision" that allows for an increase in individual
contributions to a candidate if his or her rich opponent is spending large amounts of
personal money. Under these circumstances the " ioor candidate" can receive an
increased amount of independent expenditures. Lastly, Title III requires the
sponsors of election ads to identify themselves in the ad,225 and prohibits the
contributions of minors to candidates or political parties.226
216. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 654 (2003).
217. BCRA, tit. I, § 203(b) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(c) (West Supp. 2003)).
This section does permit corporations and labor unions to possess separate segregated funds
which can be used to collect money to be used for strictly political reasons. These funds
have commonly been referred to as political action committees ("PACs"). Money collected
in these funds can be contributed to candidates as independent expenditures just as they
could under the FECA before BCRA. Id.
218. BCRA, tit. II, § 201(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)).
219. Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Reform: Relevant Constitutional Issues, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1123, 1131 (2002). He describes issue ads as: "ads that promote or attack a
federal candidate at election time, but avoid the legal prohibition on corporate and labor
expenditures in federal elections by omitting words such as 'vote for' or 'vote against."' Id.
220. See BCRA, tit. II, § 201(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(11)(B)).
221. See BCRA, tit. 11, § 213 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)).
222. See BCRA, tit. H, § 307 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A)).
223. See BCRA, tit. 1H, § 303 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441e).
224. See BCRA, tit. HI, §§ 304, 316 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(i)); Amy Keller,
Millionaire Crackdown May Be Elusive, ROLL CALL, Jan. 15, 2003 (describing how the
"Millionaire Provision" works); see also Craig Gilbert, Senate Votes To Help 'Level Playing
Field': 'Millionaire's Amendment' Allows Uneven Donations, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Mar. 21, 2001, at 1A; Greg Gordon, House to Debate Campaign Finance Bill: The
Measure's Sponsors Say That the Fall Elections Probably Won't be Affected by Any Action
in Congress, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 13, 2002, at 4A.
225. BCRA, tit. Im, § 311 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441(d)).
226. BCRA, tit. 1I, § 318 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441(k)).
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B. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission227
No sooner had BCRA been enacted--twenty minutes to be exact22s---than did
Senator Mitch McConnell file suit challenging the constitutionality of the law.229
The case first went before a special three-udge panel which handed down a very
long 230 and somewhat confusing decision. 3 1 In essence, the Panel upheld portions
of the law, but struck down other major sections including BCRA's ban on soft-
money contributions to national parties.232 The decision was promptly appealed to
the Supreme Court.
In McConnell, the Supreme Court upheld the key elements of BCRA. First,
the Court upheld the all-important ban on soft-money from Title I. This ban
prohibits certain contributions to and expenditures by national -political parties,
233
forbids federal office holders from raising or using soft-money, 2and restricts state
and local parties from using soft-money in federal election activities.235 The
Government defended the ban on soft-money by asserting a substantial need in
preventing corruption or its appearance. 236 After reviewing the record, the Court
determined that Congress was justified in passing the soft-money ban because there
was an overwhelming amount of evidence signifying the existence of political
corruption and its appearance.
237
227. 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
228. Supreme Court Rules on Campaign Finance Case: The Legal and Political Impact
of McConnell v. FEC, (CSPAN television broadcast, Dec. 11, 2003) (statement of Kenneth
W. Starr) [hereinafter Supreme Court Rules).
229. Edward Walsh, Campaign Finance Hits First Legal Test: Judges to Hear Oral
Arguments, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2002, at Al. Senator McConnell is only one of the more
than eight named plaintiffs in the case, which include well known organizations like the
Republican National Committee, the National Rifle Association, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the California Democratic Party. Oppel & Lewis, supra
note 19, at A27.
230. To be exact, the decision was 1638 pages long. This decision is thought to be the
single longest decision ever handed down by any federal court. Court Strikes Down Most of
Ban on Political Financing, NEWSDAY, May 3, 2003, at A14; Billy House, 'Soft Money' Ban
Narrowed; Federal Court Split on McCain-Feingold Reforms, ARiz. REP., May 3, 2003, at
IA.
231. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
232. Id.; Neil A. Lewis & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Campaign Finance: The Overview;
Mixed Ruling on Constitutionality of New Campaign Finance Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2003, at Al; Michael Tackett, Judges Soften Campaign Finance Law; Portions Found
Unconstitutional; High Court Will Review, Ctuc. TRIB., May 3, 2003, at Cl; Neely Tucker
& Juliet Eilperin, Election Law is Partly Struck Down: Decision Brings Uncertainly to
Election Fundraising, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at Al; Press Release, E. Joshua
Rosenkranz, Decision Today in McConnell v. FEC: Court Upholds Key Portions of
Congressional Effort to Clean up Elections (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.brennan
center.org/presscenter/releases_2003/pressrelease_2003_0502.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2004).
233. McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 659 (2003).
234. Id. at 667-68.
235. Id. at 671.
236. Id. at 660. While each of the soft-money issues presented the Court with different
First Amendment concerns, Congress passed the entire reform act as a whole, relying fully
upon the interest of preventing corruption. Id. at 659.
237. Id. at 666.
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The Court also upheld significant sections of BCRA's "electioneering
communication" provisions from Title II. BCRA's primary definition of
electioneering communications prohibited the airing of ads sixty days before a
general election or thirty days before a primary.238 The Court upheld the definition
of electioneering communications, stating that the record demonstrated that the
rigid "magic words" test had been rendered "functionally meaningless."
239
Therefore, because Buckley's express advocacy definition or magic words test had
"not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption," Congress
was justified in correcting the system with BCRA's ban on issue ads prior to an
election.
240
Additionally, the Court upheld BCRA's ban on using funds from the general
treasury of corporations and unions for "electioneering communications." 4 The
general treasury fund ban was justified through reliance on Austin. 242 The Court
maintained that Congress had an interest in preventing corruption through the
"immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form.,2 43 Thus, based upon this corruption interest, the Court found the
ban constitutional.
In the other provisions of BCRA, the Court refused to review some sections of
Title III, upheld others, and struck some down. For example, the Court refused to
review the increased limit on hard money contributions due to a lack of standing.
244
Likewise, the Court did not review the new "millionaire provisions" from § 304
and § 316. This challenge was also dismissed because the plaintiffs' lacked
standing. They failed to show an injury that was "fairly traceable" to BCRA.245
Thus, the limits on hard money contributions and the "millionaire provisions" all
continue to be valid. The Court then upheld § 311, which required those airing
political ads to clearly identify themselves as "authorized" communications that
represent the candidates or political committees.246 Conversely, the § 318 ban on
contributions by minors was found unconstitutional.247 There simply was not
238. Id. at 686.
239. Id. at 689. The Court gave a striking example of the uselessness of the test by
citing COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACITIES IN
CONNECTION wrTH 1996 FED. ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, S. REP. No. 105-167 (1998) [hereinafter
THOMPSON REPORT]. The Court cited an example contained in the report from a Montana
Congressional race. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 689 n.78. The ad went like this:
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values but took a swing at
his wife. [ ] He talks law and order ... but is himself a convicted felon.
And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to make
his own child support payments-then voted against child support
enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family values.
THOMPSON REPORT, supra, at 6305. The Court noted that these types of ads had become the
"functional equivalent of express advocacy." McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696. Therefore, the
Court upheld the ban on issue ads sixty days prior to the general election and thirty days
prior to the primary election. Id.
240. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696.
241. Id. at 695.
242. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
243. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
244. Id. at 709-10.
245. Id. at 710.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 711.
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enough evidence in the record linking it to the governmental interest.248 Unless the
evidence was more convincing, the "interest [was] simply too attenuated for § 318
to withstand heightened scrutiny."
249
V. CORRUPTION'S CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITY: MCCONNELL'S CONSEQUENCES
AND THE EFFECT ON FUTURE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS
The Court acknowledged that BCRA was unlikely to eliminate money from
politics because "money is the mother's milk of politics. 250 Because money serves
as the lifeblood of political campaigns, it is evident that its presence will not soon
disappear. Regardless of various attempts to regulate money's political power,
people will invariably find ways to infuse its influence into the system. 5 Simple
economics dictates that so long as the demand is present, supply will act to equalize
that demand.252 Or, in other words, "money, like water, will always find an
outlet. ' ' 253 Consequently, because BCRA does not eliminate money's influence, it
is unreasonable to believe that BCRA will drive corruption and its appearance from
the system.
The time will soon come when Congress attempts to enact additional campaign
finance regulations. Immediately following McConnell, Senators McCain and
Feingold announced plans to replace the FEC, reform presidential public financing,
and reduce the costs of television advertising for candidates.2 4 These plans for
future reform demonstrate that some members of Congress view McConnell as a
blank check to enact further campaign finance regulations while possibly
248. Id. (finding that "the Government offers scant evidence of this form of evasion").
249. Id.
250. Id. at 663.
251. Briffault, supra note 200, at 1759; see also Christy Hoppe, 'Soft Money' Flows to
New Outlets; Interest Groups Taking Over Parties' Role as Fund Debate Continues,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 13, 2003, at IA (discussing how the impact of McConnell is
shifting the soft-money once given to political parties to unregulated special interest groups).
252. Because campaign financing can be looked at through an economic model,
possible reforms have also been proposed which would use traditional economic principles.
See generally Justin A. Nelson, The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 524 (2000).
253. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 706. Even Senators McCain and Feingold did not believe
that BCRA would completely "shut down the political money hunt." Jill Abramson, A Law
Survives. Now, Let's Subvert It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Dl; 150 CONG. REc. S576,
576-78 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain); see also MtrrcH, supra note 59,
at 47. Mutch, similar to McCain and Feingold, believes that:
The history of campaign finance law offerts] little reason to believe that
legislation can drive interested money out of politics. Partly this is
because any law can be evaded: lawyers, accountants, and fund raisers
are paid to devise imaginative schemes for getting money past the law.
But the deeper reason is that no law can weaken the resolve of the
powerful forces behind that money to influence federal elections.
Id. at 191; see also Jeanne Cummings & Julia Angwin, Donors Look For the Loopholes to
Campaign-Finance Limits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2003, at Al (noting that even after uphold
BCRA, there is plenty of room to use money to influence elections).
254. Abramson, supra note 253, at Dl. Other groups also began pushing for change
shortly after the Court's decision in McConnell. Glen Justice, Campaign Finance Groups to
Push for More Changes, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2003, at A12; Campaign-Finance Reformers
Target FEC, MSNBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2003, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3692715/
(last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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disregarding potential First Amendment violations. Congress, however, must act
with caution. Many new regulations may have the potential to infringe upon
protected First Amendment speech. While McConnell clearly authorizes additional
campaign finance regulations, and gives more discretion to Congress, Congress's
power still has limits. As the Court declared in Marbury v. Madison,255 even the
enumerated powers of Congress "are defined, and limited; and... those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten."
256
Because the Court has placed limitations on Congress, it is important for
Congress to have a plan before enacting future regulations. This Note proposes a
plan that includes two basic principles that will help avoid invalidation. First,
Congress must act within the scope of the defined government interest in
preventing corruption. Previous campaign finance precedent such as Buckley,
Austin, Shrink Missouri, and Colorado 11,257 have already established that this
limitation is constitutionally necessary. Second, to come within the scope of the
government interest, Congress must justify future regulations by creating a clear
record of corruption. So long as Congress acts within these limitations, future
regulation will fall within the boundaries the Court has identified and avoid
constitutional concerns.
A. Deferential Approach to Congressional Conclusions Regarding Corruption
The first step in a successful legislative strategy requires Congress to act within
the set boundaries of eliminating corruption or the appearance of corruption as
defined by the Court's long line of campaign finance cases. This is important
because even after McConnell, campaign finance precedent remains intact. The
dissent vigorously argued that some if not all of the former precedent should be
overturned.258 However, the majority pertinaciously refused. The significance of
the majority's action reaffirms with strong force the importance of all of the prior
campaign finance decisions. These decisions were left untouched for the very
purpose of acting as a road map for Congress in its future navigation through
campaign financing. In the passage of BCRA, Congress successfully used these
past decisions as a guide. 259 The Court praised Congress for relying on this
authority. It said, "Congress properly relied on the recognition of its authority
contained in Buckley and its progeny.' 260 Thus, these decisions, along with
McConnell, continue to serve the same purpose and should not be ignored.
One obvious example from McConnell was the Court's reliance on earlier
precedent defining corruption as the selling of access to federal candidates and
officeholders. 261 The Court looked to Buckley's proposition that Congress had the
255. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
256. Id. at 176.
257. See FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001);
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 454 U.S. 652 (1990); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
258. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), was wrongly decided."); id. at 762
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Instead of extending Austin to suppress new and vibrant voices, I
would overrule it and return our campaign finance jurisprudence to principles consistent
with the First Amendment." (citations omitted)).
259. Id. at 657.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 665.
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ability to regulate the buying of access. The examples of corruption found in
Buckley included executives that claimed that campaign contributions were like a
"calling card, something that would get us in the door and make our point of view
heard ... ,262 Today this identical selling of access was also found and likened to a
subway token. 2 63 While the circumstances were slightly different, the types of
corruption in the two examples are the same. Purchasing of political privilege and
buying exclusive access are the types of corruption that FECA tried to eliminate
and are identical to the corruption that BCRA addressed. Because Congress
attempted to regulate essentially the same type of corruption, the Court upheld the
law.
It will be argued that McConnell gives Congress greater discretion in
determining when it can regulate. To some extent this is true and was recognized
by the Court. The Court noted that the "less rigorous standard of review ' 264 applied
to contribution limits "shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh
competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise.
It also provides Congress with a sufficient opportunity to anticipate and respond to
concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the
political process. ' '265 However, it is important not to mischaracterize this authority
beyond its intended meaning. Even though the Court was willing to give greater
deference to Congress, the intent was that the definition of corruption, properly
construed by Congress, simply included the ability to go beyond actual quid pro
quo corruption. The plaintiffs and the dissent both argued in favor of a narrow
reading of actual quid pro quo corruption.266 The majority did not agree, however,
and demonstrated deference to Congress's determination that the definition of
corruption merited a broader interpretation. Yet even under this broader
interpretation, McConnell did not recognize any new forms of corruption. Rather,
the Court drew from preexisting definitions of corruption including both actual
corruption and its appearance. It recognized forms of corruption such as
circumvention, buying of access, large money donations, and improper influence.
Thus, these are the forms of corruption that will likely be recognized by the Court
in the future. Congress has the power to regulate, and is given deference, but must
still work within these recognized boundaries.
262. Id. at 646 n.5.
263. Mr. Johnny Chung, a Taiwan businessman, CEO of Automated Intelligent
Systems, Inc. of California, and "die hard democrat," contributed $366,000 during the 1995-
96 election cycle to the DNC. THOMPSON REPORT, supra note 239, at 783. By contributing
such large sums of money Chung was able to gain special access to the White House at least
forty-nine different times. Id. Chung was granted surprisingly easy access even though he
was regarded by the National Security Council as a "hustler." Id. He was known to be using
the access to entertain his foreign clients. Id. Moreover, "White House officials actually
collected money from him in the First Lady's office in exchange for allowing him to bring a
delegation of his clients to White House events." Id. What is most extraordinary about the
entire situation is that Mr. Chung acknowledged that his contributions to the DNC bought
him special privileges of access. Chung said, "[t]he White House is like a subway: You have
to put in coins to open the gates." Id.
264. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656.
265. Id. at 656-57.
266. "[P]laintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly
established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-
votes corruption .... Justice Kennedy would limit Congress' regulatory interest only to the
prevention of the actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption ..." Id. at 664-65 (emphasis in
original).
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Final support for this legislative strategy comes as a warning from the Court
itself. It made clear that the deference given to Congress only extends so far. It said
that justifying regulation based upon "mere political favoritism or opportunity for
influence alone is insufficient" to withstand scrutiny.z67 The Court's unwillingness
to recognize political favoritism or opportunity for influence as corruption or the
appearance of it reveals that the corruption definition has boundaries. This indicates
that the Court is willing to grant Congress deference, but Congress has limited
leeway in classifying the type of corruption that fits within the definition. Congress
remains under an obligation to work within the boundaries of recognized forms of
corruption or the appearance of it. Therefore, a successful legislative strategy for
future campaign finance laws includes regulating within the proper bounds
established by Buckley and its progeny. Remaining true to these directions is
fundamental to the successful passage of campaign finance laws.
B. Corruption Still Controls: Congress's Duty to Establish a Record
In addition to exercising its discretion to regulate based upon recognized forms
of corruption, Congress must also create a clear record demonstrating corruption in
the political system. For example, if Congress wants to overhaul the presidential
public financing system-and the new regulations pose potential First Amendment
concerns-then it must show that current practices are corrupt. Thus, even with
Congress's increased deference, McConnell does not relieve Congress's burden to
demonstrate a need for change by proving that actual corruption or its appearance
exists. On the other hand, by making this showing in the legislative record,
Congress satisfies the Court's requirement to demonstrate that corruption or the
appearance of it exists, thus justifying the law.
Several areas of constitutional law require Congress to compile a record before
enacting legislation. These other areas of constitutional doctrine help to provide
insight into what appears to be a similar emerging legislative record requirement in
campaign financing. Two examples are found in the doctrine from the Commerce
Clause and from § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. These clauses give Congress
broad power to legislate, yet that power is not infinite. The enumerated regulatory
power has been limited by the Court under certain circumstances.268 In some cases,
acts of Congress have been invalidated due to a failure to make a legislative record
sufficient to justify its actions.
The limiting of enumerated regulatory powers based upon an insufficient
legislative record in these other areas lends support to the idea that the Court is also
beginning to impose similar restrictions upon campaign financing.2 69 The Court's
most recent campaign finance decision shows that the Court is placing a great
degree of weight upon evidence from the legislative record. Without support from
the record demonstrating corruption, the success of future regulations raises serious
267. Id. at 666.
268. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) ("The Court has
insisted that it must impose 'judicially enforceable outer limits' on Congress's enumerated
powers .... ).
269. While the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases generally deal with
Congress's ability to infringe on state rights without violating the Constitution, they provide
a fitting analogy offering insight into when Congress can enact campaign finance regulations
without violating the First Amendment.
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doubt. To show the importance of the legislative record, the analysis begins with a
brief look at the role the legislative record plays in both Commerce Clause and § 5
precedent. Finally, the analysis looks at the Court's movement towards a legislative
record requirement in campaign financing, concluding that the legislative record is
now vital to the success of future campaign finance regulations.
1. The Commerce Clause
Congress gets its power to regulate interstate commerce expressly from Article
I, Section 8, of the Constitution. It used to be the case that Congress had almost
unlimited authority to regulate interstate commerce-including even the entirely
intrastate activities of a small local dairy farmer in Ohio. 270 However, in 1995, the
Supreme Court began to change this all encompassing power by limiting
Congress's ability to regulate. In United States v. Lopez, 271 the Court invalidated
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.272 The Court invalidated the law because
the possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school did not "substantially affect"
interstate commerce. 273 The Court found it significant that Congress did not
establish any legislative findings that gun possession in a school zone actually
affected interstate commerce when passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act.27 4 In
defending the law, the Government was not able to point to a legislative record
showing evidence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 27 5 Instead, the
Government asked the Court to find that firearm possession in a school zone affects
interstate commerce. 27 6 The Court was unwilling to do so, stating that would
require it to "pile inference upon inference., 277 Without some evidence showing a
connection between the statute and interstate commerce, allowing such regulations
would eliminate any "distinction between what is truly national [commerce] and
what is truly local. 278 Therefore, without any evidence of the connection,
Congress's power to regulate was limited.
270. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (finding no denial of due process by a
federal government regulation restricting instrastate wheat production as applied to a dairy
farmer's production of wheat for personal consumption).
271. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000) (held unconstitutional 1995).
273. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. It has been suggested that Lopez may not clearly hold that
Congress is prohibited from regulating in this area. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking
Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 795, 797 (1996). Accordingly, "it can perhaps be
interpreted as holding only the narrower position that this particular attempt by Congress to
regulate the field failed, without saying anything more general that would automatically
disqualify all subsequent attempts." Id. Interpreting the holding in this fashion requires
consideration of the lack of a legislative record. Id. at 797-98 n. 13.
274. Lopez, 514 U.S. 562-63. The Court noted that "as part of our independent
evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative
findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate
commerce .... " Id. at 562. The Government conceded that, "[n]either the statute nor its
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone." Id.
275. Id. at 562-63.
276. Id. at 563-64.
277. Id. at 567.
278. Id. at 567-68; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of
Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2180, 2243 (2001) (noting that "[o]ne of the
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Again, in United States v. Morrison,279 the Court declared that Congress had
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority. The issue raised in Morrison was the
constitutionality of a civil claim provision in the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 ("VAWA"). 280 For a second time the Court recognized that Congress's ability
to regulate using the Commerce Clause was not without limit.281 It emphasized the
Lopez holding in which the Court had struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act
because "the link between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce was attenuated.",282 Unlike Lopez, however, the Court did have
somewhat of a legislative record to analyze in Morrison.283 The problem for
VAWA arose because Congress relied on reasoning that had been previously
prohibited by the Court.2 4 Congress's reasoning was improper because it drew
conclusions that were too attenuated to substantially affect interstate commerce.
Congress was correct in their findings that gender-violence did occur, but its
findings were not legally sufficient to constitutionally justify regulation by the
Commerce Clause.285 Consequently, the Court was unwilling to uphold the law
because the legislative record did not provide proper evidence of the problem that
Congress sought to remedy.
As a result, Congress still has extremely broad power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause, but the Court has made it clear that this enumerated power has
limits. If Congress attempts to exercise its Article I, Section 8 power, and there is
some question whether regulation lies at the fringe of that power, clear evidence of
a substantial effect on commerce must be found in the legislative record. Without
proper evidence, the law will likely be invalidated. 86 Thus, the key to unlocking
the fringe regulatory power is tied to an evidentiary legislative record compiled by
Congress.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment produces similar circumstances. The importance
of legislative findings becomes more apparent by looking at Congress's power to
regulate under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In City of Boerne v. Flores,287 the
Court faced the question of the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 2" Relying on its enforcement power from the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress sought to impose RFRA's "far-reaching and
difficulties in Lopez was the lack of evidence in the congressional record or before the Court
demonstrating any real need for concurrent federal criminal jurisdiction and enforcement").
279. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
280. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
281. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608.
282. Id. at 612.
283. Id. at 614. "In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we faced in
Lopez, § 1398 is supported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-
motivated violence has on victims and their families." (emphasis in original) Id.
284. Id. at 615.
285. Id. at 617.
286. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REv. 5, 142 (2001) (observing that after Lopez and Morrison "the Court seemed to
be leading up to an analysis whereby it would review the legislative record to determine
whether Congress's findings were warranted").
287. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
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substantial. . . provisions" on the States. 289 The Court struck down RFRA, finding
that Congress exceeded its remedial power under § 5. Congress's power did not
extend to defining the substantive rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.29 °
Instead, Congress had only the remedial power of enforcing the Amendment.
Further, the Court reasoned that those enforcement powers must have a
"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.",2 9 1 Also important to the Court's reasoning was
the fact that Congress failed to find evidence of religious discrimination sufficient
292to justify RFRA. The Court stated that "RFRA's legislative record lacks
examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry."
293
The Court said it afforded great deference to Congress when reviewing
24provisions enacted pursuant to § 5. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion was quick
to point out defects with the legislative findings. The Court did not specifically
hold that a lack of legislative findings would prove dispositive, but "the tone of the
opinion suggested that perceived inadequacies in the legislative materials would
count heavily against the legislation.",295 Consequently, the opinion, in effect,
suggested that without a legislative showing of constitutional violations,
Congress's power to regulate was void.
Cases following Boerne further entrenched this principle of legislative record
review into Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 296 In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,2 9 7 the Court invalidated the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act ("Patent Remedy
Act"). 298 First, the Court recognized Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
299
Even so, to correctly exercise this power, the legislation had to be "appropriate"
under the holding from Boerne.300 The Court reminded Congress that to invoke § 5,
"it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such
conduct." 30 ' In analyzing the Patent Remedy Act, the Court found that Congress
did not act within this power. Congress failed to "identifty] [a] pattern of patent
289. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516.
290. Id. at 516-20.
291. Id. at 520.
292. Id. at 530; William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review,
54 STAN. L. REv. 87, 112 (2001).
293. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
294. Id. at 536.
295. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 292, at 112-13. Furthermore, "[tihe opinion
strongly implied that Congress' invocation of its Enforcement Clause powers entailed a
burden of justification and that that burden could be met only through information contained
in written materials generated by Congress." Id. at 115.
296. See generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 80 (2001) (discussing the "phantom" legislative history requirement in § 5 cases).
297. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
298. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000).
299. Id. at 637.
300. Id.; see also Erin Rosen, Casenote, An Occasion for a More Thorough Analysis:
The New Findings Requirement and Congressional Power Under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment After United States v. Morrison, 90 CAL. L. REv. 573 (2002)
(discussing "appropriate" legislation after Boerne).
301. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639.
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infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations."3 °2 After
reviewing the evidence in the record, the Court could not find anything substantial
enough to justify the legislation. The missing link for Congress was a missing
legislative record.30 3 The majority did not discuss deference to Congress;
conversely, they shifted the focus to Congress's burden to create a legislative
record.304 Finally, Florida Prepaid appeared to place an even greater importance
upon the lacking legislative record than did Boerne.
During the next term, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court
answered the question of whether Congress could abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity by imposing liability for violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA").3 °5 Congress attempted to impose liability on the
States using the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel declared
this to be an improper use of the power. Once again the majority found that
Congress had not enacted "appropriate legislation." 30 6 In determining the
appropriateness of the legislation, as in Boerne and Florida Prepaid, the Court
performed a close examination of the legislative record. The Court stated that "the
ADEA's legislative record as a whole .. .reveals that Congress had virtually no
reason to believe that state and local governments were unconstitutionally
discriminating against their employees on the basis of age." 30 7 Because Congress
failed to include any evidence of age discrimination, the Court was left without a
reason why such legislation could be proportional to any constitutional violation.
308
Accordingly, Kimel reaffirms the proposition that "Congress is obligated to make
formal findings of fact supported by substantial legislative-record evidence when it
acts at (what the Court perceives to be) the margins of its constitutional
authority.
' 3°9
If there was any doubt about the Court's reliance on the legislative record after
Kimel, the Court dispelled this uncertainty in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett.31° In Garrett, the Court invalidated an attempt by Congress to
abrogate States' sovereign immunity by subjecting them to liability for violations
of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 1 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist recognized the requirement from Florida Prepaid and
Kimel that Congress must identify a history and pattern of unconstitutional
302. Id. at 640.
303. Id. at 642. "[T]he legislative record still provides little support for the proposition
that Congress sought to remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the Patent
Remedy Act." Id. Because there was no support, it became clear that "the Court struck down
a federal statute solely because it found the legislative record supporting the Act
incomplete." A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 328, 351 (2001).
304. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 292, at 114.
305. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
306. Id. at 82-83.
307. Id. at 91.
308. Id.
309. Bryant & Simeone, supra note 303, at 352; see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra
note 292, at 115 (noting that Congress did not produce sufficient evidence of
unconstitutional discrimination).
310. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
311. Id. at 360-63.
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discrimination. 312 He then explained that Congress had once more failed to do so.
"Congress assembled only . . . minimal evidence of unconstitutional state
discrimination in employment against the disabled., 313 Because "[t]he legislative
record of the ADA... simply fail[ed] to show that Congress did in fact identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled,"
'3 14
there was not enough evidence to allow for abrogation of sovereign immunity. The
Court ultimately based its holding on the feebleness of the legislative record, and
thus the lack of congressional findings.
315
Finally, the most recent case addressing Congress's Enforcement Clause power
came in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.316 The issue in Hibbs
was similar to the one decided in Garrett. The Court determined whether Congress
could abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity using § 5 powers,
enabling a state employee a remedy under The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 ("FMLA"). 317 The Court found that this was a valid exercise of § 5 power and
that Congress could create a private right of action against the states. The
difference between the ADA in Garrett, and the FMLA in Hibbs, was that
Congress had taken notice of the importance of legislative findings and included
proof of discrimination in FMLA's legislative history.318 This information
contained in the record proved essential to the Court's analysis. The Court pointed
to three specific congressional findings as evidence of discrimination in favor of
maternity leave policies over paternity leave policies. 319 The evidence
demonstrated that Congress had enacted appropriate legislation congruent and
312. Id. at 368.
313. Id. at 370.
314. Id. at 368.
315. Geoffrey Landward, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett and
the Equal Education Opportunity Act: Another Act Bites the Dust, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
313, 320 (2002); see also Kramer, supra note 286, at 146 (recognizing that the
"constitutionality of the ADA thus... turned on an inquiry into whether the congressional
prohibition could be justified by a pattern of state discrimination against the disabled").
316. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
317. Id. at 1976-77.
318. Id. at 1980-81. Another distinction between Hibbs and the earlier Enforcement
Clause cases is that unconstitutional gender discrimination by the states was more readily
found in Hibbs because the equal protection standard for gender discrimination is
intermediate, not rational basis, review. Id. at 1981-82.
319. Id. at 1979. First, "the FMLA's legislative record reflects[] a 1990 Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) survey" stating that a significantly greater percentage of employees in
the private sector were covered by maternity leave policies as opposed to paternity leave
policies. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 103-3, at 14-15 (1993)). Joint Congressional Hearings and
other legislative findings determined that this same trend was true in public sector
employment. Id. at 1979 n.3. Second, testimony given to Congress verified that "[p]arental
leave for fathers ... is rare. Even ... [w]here child-care leave policies do exist, men, both in
the public and private sectors, receive notoriously discriminatory treatment in their requests
for such leave." Id. at 1979 (emphasis in original). Lastly,
Congress had evidence that, even where state laws and policies were
not facially discriminatory, they were applied in discriminatory ways. It
was aware of the "serious problems with the discretionary nature of
family leave," because when "the authority to grant leave and to
arrange the length of that leave rests with individual supervisors," it
leaves "employees open to discretionary and possibly unequal
treatment."
Id. at 1980 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 10-11 (1993)).
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proportional to preventing unconstitutional gender discrimination. Therefore,
Congress had identified a pattern of discrimination and the "record of
unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination
[was] weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation." 320
Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Garrett, and Hibbs all expand the principle
that when Congress chooses to exercise its § 5 power, it can do so only after it has
made clear findings of constitutional violations.321 These findings must be
contained in the legislative record. If the findings are sufficient, they act as a
necessary justification for the law, as they did for the FLMA in Hibbs. Conversely,
if the legislative record lacks proper evidence, the law will be struck down as in
Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett.
3. Campaign Finance
In the same way that Congress has enumerated constitutional power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it also has
enumerated power to regulate federal elections. Furthermore, just as the Court has
limited Congress's Commerce Clause and § 5 power, it also has limited the
Election Clause power. Beginning with Buckley and its progeny, the Court created
the framework for limiting that power through the First Amendment. To overcome
this hurdle, the burden is placed upon Congress to show that campaign finance
regulations are passed in an effort to curb corruption or the appearance of
corruption. The significance of McConnell, like Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Garrett,
and Hibbs, is that it signifies what Congress must do to fulfill this burden. 322 When
congressional regulations approach the outside limits of its power by infringing
upon the First Amendment, Congress can regulate using the corruption rationale
only by establishing a legislative record. Doing so brings Congress within the
scope of its constitutional power. Buckley, Bellotti, Colorado I, and McConnell all
lend support to the theory that the Court requires a proper legislative record to
sustain the constitutionality of a congressional act.
Initially, Buckley implicitly demonstrated the need for Congress to make some
type of evidentiary showing to justify the use of the corruption rationale,323 yet the
320. Id. at 1981.
321. One possible reason the Court requires a legislative record in § 5 cases arises from
its desire to keep somewhat of an oversight over Congress. See Kramer, supra note 286, at
151 (noting that the legislative record requirement exists because the Court "worries about
not letting Congress escape its grasp: close scrutiny of the legislative record is necessary if
the Justices are to maintain interpretive control, for otherwise Congress might be able to
elude the Court's efforts to cabin its activities").
322. The Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment cases deal with different
legislative powers, yet the analogy still applies to the Election Clause. Under each
circumstance, the Court has limited Congress's ability to legislate based on constitutional
concerns.
323. See generally Schultz, supra note 119 (maintaining that Buckley contains a
legislative record requirement). Professor Schultz argues that "advocates of legislation
[should] document specific evidence of political corruption in their jurisdiction,
demonstrating how such corruption or its appearance supports specific forms of reform
legislation." Id. at 133. This Note supports and develops Professor Schultz's conclusion to a
greater degree. Since the writing of his article, recent Court decisions have shaped the
requirement and made it even more evident than it was in 1999. Since then, the Court has
decided a number of significant cases offering support for the conclusion that legislatures
must construct a record showing evidence of corruption when passing campaign finance
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Court never fully clarified the existence or importance of the requirement. In the
wake of Watergate and the 1972 elections, the Court did not have to search-out or
detail evidence of campaign fund misuse. As a result, the "Court spen[t] little time
discussing what Congress had to prove to demonstrate that contributions present a
serious corruption danger."324 Shortly afterwards, Bellotti again rejected the
Government's argument that it had an interest in preventing corruption because it
failed to exhibit a "record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened
imminently to undermine democratic processes" or that there was a lack of
"confidence of the citizenry in government. 3 25
Years later the Court began to show an inclination to look to the legislative
record in several other cases. Colorado I did not deal directly with the
Government's burden to justify contribution limits; nevertheless, it indicates the
importance of a record of corruption. In its analysis, the Court found that the
Government could not "point to record evidence or legislative findings [that]
suggest[] any special corruption problem in respect to independent party
expenditures."02 6 The only evidence in the record about the purpose for the
regulations was that Congress enacted them to enhance the role of political
parties. 327 This was not sufficient because mere inference or speculation as to
corruption was unacceptable.328 Likewise, Congress's "mere conjecture [was not]
adequate to carry a First Amendment burden." 32 9 Shrink Missouri then validated
these principles. It confirmed Colorado I by recognizing that "the principal opinion
... charged the Government with failure to show a real risk of corruption .... 33
Furthermore, Shrink Missouri indicated that the amount of evidence required to
satisfy the burden would vary depending upon the significance and extent of the
regulation.3 Shrink Missouri is different in one regard because the Court did not
rely upon an overwhelming amount of evidence to justify the law. The Court relied
on less substantial amounts of evidence because the case dealt with an atypical and
less extensive campaign finance regulation that was not passed by Congress.
Furthermore, perhaps the most significant piece of evidence relied upon by the
Court was the fact that the contribution limits were enacted by the people of
Missouri through a statewide vote on the proposition. "[A]n overwhelming 74
laws. First, the Court's general trend has been moving toward a legislative record
requirement. Morrison more firmly entrenches this requirement into Commerce Clause
regulation. See supra Part V.B.1. And Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Garrett, and Hibbs, all
decided after 1999, unmistakably demonstrate the Court's practice of requiring a sufficient
legislative record to justify prophylactic legislation under § 5. See supra Part V.B.2. Second,
Shrink Missouri, Colorado II, and McConnell have been handed down since Schultz wrote
his article. These recent cases, especially McConnell, confirm the Court's requirement for
evidence demonstrating corruption and substantiate Schultz's claim that Buckley contains a
requirement for sufficient evidence to justify reform legislation. See supra Part LV.B.
324. Briffault, supra note 200, at 1746.
325. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978).
326. Colorado L 518 U.S. 604,618 (1996).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 617-18.
329. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000) (citing Colorado
1, 518 U.S. at 616).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 391 (stating "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty
and plausibility of the justification raised").
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percent of the voters of Missouri determined that contribution limits [were]
necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof." 332
Several other elements made Shrink Missouri an easier decision for the Court
than many of its other campaign finance cases.333 First, the regulations were not• • 334
tremendously significant. Additionally, even though the amount of evidence was
small, there was nothing casting doubt on what was presented. 335 Had the
circumstances been different, the Court would have likely required a stronger
showing. 336 The Court stated that "[t]here might, of course, be need for a more
extensive evidentiary documentation" were the circumstances of the case different
and more akin to the questions from Buckley. 337 Therefore, Shrink Missouri did not
draw a new line as to the type or amount of evidence required and is not useful in
this regard. Instead, it is valuable because, like Colorado I, it reaffirms the Court's
intention to look for evidence of corruption or its appearance notwithstanding the
situation.
Finally, McConnell solidifies these implications in campaign financing. In
upholding BCRA's ban on soft-money, the Court referred to the importance of
332. Id. at 394 (quoting Carver v. Nixon, 882 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo. 1995)).
Furthermore, there was "no reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion
among voters." Id. at 395. Missouri does not keep any records of its legislative history, thus
making it difficult for the Court to look for evidence of corruption. See id. at 393. As a
result, the Court looked to what information it did have. It used voting information as
evidence to justify the law. Most persuasive was the high percentage of the population that
voted in favor of the law, which demonstrated that a majority of the population perceived
corruption within the system. See id. at 394. This evidence, along with other testimony
presented, helped the state to satisfy its evidentiary burden. Gregory Comeau, Recent
Development, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 268 (2003).
Other evidence cited by the Court included "an affidavit from State Senator Wayne Goode,
the co-chair of the state legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform
.... stat[ing] that Contributions have the 'real potential to buy votes."' Shrink Missouri, 528
U.S. at 393 (quoting affidavit of Wayne Goode). Additionally, both the Supreme Court and
the lower court looked at various articles appearing in Missouri newspapers pointing to the
public's perceived belief that money was corrupting the political process and calling for
campaign finance reform to get big money out of politics. Id. at 393-94 (citing Editorial, The
Central Issue is Trust, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 31, 1993, at 6C; J. Mannies, Auditor
Race May Get Too Noisy to be Ignored, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 11, 1994, at 04B;
Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 nn.6-7 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(citing John A. Dvorak, Election Reform Backed Lid on Contributions to Campaigns Wins
Carnahan's Support, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 14, 1993, at B1; Kevin Q. Murphy, Low-key
Proposition A Would Refashion Election Financing, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 27, 1994, at
Al; Voters Guide, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 1994, at 08; Kathy Richardson, Letter
to the Editor, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1994, at 15B; Robyn Steely, Editorial,
Money and State Senators, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, Aug. 21, 1994, at 3B). Several other
relevant articles appearing in newspapers around the same time period including: Editorial,
Four Proposals on the Missouri Ballot, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1994, at 6B).
333. The case did not "present a close call requiring further definition of whatever the
State's evidentiary obligation may be." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 393.
334. Id. at 387, 392-93.
335. Id. at 394.
336. Id. Additionally, had a legislative record with testimony and committee reports
been present, it would have alleviated problems further. See Christina E. Wells, Beyond
Campaign Finance: The First Amendment Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 66 Mo. L. REv. 141, 154 (2001).
337. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 394.
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evidence in the record more than ten different times. Because of this voluminous
record of evidence, the Court found that BCRA fit within the approved government
interest making it constitutional. The Court said, "[the record contains] substantial
evidence to support Congress' determination that large soft-money contributions to
national political parties give rise to corruption and the appearance of
corruption." 338 Just as the legislative record was sufficient to justify the enactment
of prophylactic § 5 legislation in Hibbs, the substantial record in McConnell
justified campaign financing restrictions on First Amendment speech.
In analyzing the all-important ban on soft-money, the McConnell Court found
that the evidence in the record demonstrated "that candidates and donors alike have
in fact exploited the soft-money loophole."339 Such findings were ascertained from
over 60,000 pages of documents submitted in defense of the law.34° This collective
evidence proved Congress's belief that corruption or the appearance of corruption
existed in the political system.341 The documents contained many legislative
histories and committee reports from previous legislative sessions.342 One key
Senate report emerged from the legislative history of those bills.
This key report was generated by the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs while investigating alleged campaign financing misconduct by President
Clinton and Vice President Al Gore during the 1996 election cycle. 343 The
committee investigation had an approved budget of $4.35 million, issued 427
subpoenas, reviewed over 1,500,000 pages of documents, and took over 200
witness interviews and over 200 depositions. 34 The committee also held thirty-two
days of hearings, including testimony from seventy-two witnesses. These hearings
338. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 666 (2003).
339. Id. at 662. It could be argued that the Court went beyond relying upon any
evidence whatsoever when addressing the Levin Amendment prohibiting state parties from
using soft-money in federal election activities. The Court stated that in this area Congress
had only "made a prediction" about what might happen. Id. at 672. However, the Court
acknowledged that there was "at least as much evidence as there was in Buckley that such
donations have been made with the intent . . . of gaining influence over federal
officeholders." Id. at 672-73. Thus, simply because Congress made a prediction does not
diminish the importance of the fact that it was required to make a "neither novel nor
implausible" prediction based upon a substantial record of corruption. Id. (quoting Shrink
Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391).
340. Amy Keller & Damon Chappie, Court Battle Set to Kick Off; Reform Law
Challenge Starts Wednesday, ROLL CALL, Dec. 2, 2002. Many of the documents, such as
briefs and some of the record, are available from the Supreme Court's website. See
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Cases, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/bcra/bcra.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2004). Additionally, briefs and other documents relating to the
proceedings before the special three-judge panel are available from Stanford Law School.
See Campaign Finance Materials, Stanford Law School, at http://www.law.stanford.edu
/library/campaignflnance/#press (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
341. See Oppel & Lewis, supra note 229, at A27 (stating that lawyers will be relying on
evidence "from lawmakers and political leaders ... presented [to] the judges with what they
believe are repeated examples of the [corrupting] influence of... money").
342. See, e.g., supra note 208.
343. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 652. While a major motivating factor in the Senate
investigation was to inspect Democratic fundraising practices, there was also a report
prepared by the minority party which brought to light many of the questionable fundraising
practices by the Republican Party. Id.
344. THOMPSON REPORT, supra note 239, at 14-15.
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and the report that followed were an attempt by Congress to uncover corruption
and the appearance of corruption in current political culture.
Both Congress and the Court relied heavily upon the report's findin s. First,
the report contained an assortment of problems and possible reforms. 3 These
suggested reforms played a substantial role in congressional action leading to
BCRA's enactment. During BCRA's debate, various Senators cited the report as
evidence of current corruption in the political process.346 Notably, many of the
proposed reforms from the report were eventually implemented. Furthermore, the
McConnell majority heavily relied on the report in making its conclusions.347
Shortly after McConnell, Senator McCain recognized the importance the Court
placed upon the record created by Congress. He said, "[t]he mountain of evidence
that was compiled . . . provided a solid foundation for the Supreme Court's
decision to close loopholes through which were flowing hundreds of millions of
dollars in soft money."8 The Court cited to these numerous examples in the report
as congressional findings of corruption. It was these and other endless examples of
corruption that provided the justification for upholding BCRA.
The Court also looked at whether Congress truly believed that soft-money
contributions had a corrupting influence. It stated that "[b]oth common sense and
the ample record in these cases confirm Congress' belief that they do." 349 The
record abounded in examples of individuals exploiting soft-money provisions
through the selling of access to candidates and office holders.350 These examples
occurred on both sides of the political aisle. For example, the record showed that
the Republican National Committee had two donor programs, which granted access
to senior elected republican leadership in exchange for large soft-money donations
to the party.351 On the other hand, large soft-money contributions to the Democratic
Party amounted to an invitation to attend one of the 133 "coffees" hosted by
President Clinton or an overnight stay in the White House Lincoln Bedroom.
312
This buying of access was the same type of corruption the Buckley Court found to
be a compelling governmental interest. Likewise, because this evidence was
exactly the type relied upon by the Court to justify the law in Buckley, it proved an
equally sufficient justification for BCRA.
345. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 653.
346. 147 CONG. REc. S3138 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (statements of Sen. Levin and
Sen. Thompson).
347. Supreme Court Rules, supra note 228 (statement of Thomas E. Mann).
348. 150 CONG. REc. S576 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain). He also
recognized that the "strength of the evidence on the extent of corruption and the appearance
of corruption as well as the creativity with which the campaign finance laws were being
evaded led the Supreme Court to uphold BCRA." Id.
349. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 661.
350. Id. at 664. The Court recognized that the evidence showed many CEOs and
business owners held the belief that large soft-money donations were a cost of doing
business, and that making these large donations was the only method of getting access to
office holders. Id. at 663 n.46. The national parties utilize this attitude to their advantage and
pressed business leaders to give large donations. See id. at 663 n.47.
351. Id. at 653.
352. Id. at 652; see also THOMPSON REPORT, supra note 239, at 783. During that
election cycle the individuals who attended the "coffees" contributed $26.4 million, with
much of that money contributed especially close to the time they attended the event. Id. at
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In the plaintiffs' attack on BCRA, they argued that there was no record of
corruption. They believed the law should not be upheld because Congress had
failed to show any "real or apparent corruption."'1 3 The Court dismissed the
argument, finding that the record supported the opposite conclusion. 354 Congress
had in fact made a connection between soft-money and a corrupting influence. This
corrupting influence occurred in many forms, but several notable incidents showed
that large soft-money contributions were followed by a failure to enact certain
legislation.355 To claim that such improper influence over the legislative calendar
was not a corrupting influence was only to disregard common sense.
It is clear that the Court relied heavily on the Thompson Report, as well as
other evidence, to buttress Congress's belief that BRCA was passed to curb
356 35political corruption. In this case, the record was "replete with examples. 357
These examples from BCRA's record allowed Congress to regulate campaign
financing without overstepping its bounds. The Court acknowledged that
Congress's power did have boundaries. Similar to the way the Court had limited
Congress's power in Morrison and Lopez, it applied the same limiting principle to
the Election Clause.358 However, unlike Morrison and Lopez, the McConnell Court
found that Congress had established a connection to the interest in the legislative
record. Congress had demonstrated a "legitimate interest in maintaining the
integrity" of the political system by keeping it free from corruption. 359 The key was
Congress's ability to justify its actions. The Court stated, "our... analysis turns on
our finding that those interests are sufficient to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.
Given that finding, we cannot conclude that those interests are insufficient to
ground Congress' exercise of its Elections Clause power." 360 As a result, unlike
Lopez and Morrison, BCRA's record contained the necessary and proper
information that drew the connection between the government interest in corruption
and facts showing that the corruption actually existed. Thus, Congress had properly
exercised its Election Clause power.
Finally, by interpreting McConnell to impose this type of legislative record
requirement upon Congress in campaign financing, Court will maintain ultimate
authority to define the law.361 In this case, granting complete legislative deference
and requiring no legislative record would empower Congress with unbridled
control to mold and shape vital First Amendment activity. It is unlikely that the
Court intended McConnell to stand for such a principle. Other areas of
constitutional law illustrate the Court's unwillingness to completely give Congress
ultimate authority to define the Constitution. Fourteenth Amendment cases show
that the Court's method for retaining this ultimate control is to make inquiries into
the legislative record. In Boerne, the Court was not willing to allow Congress to
353. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 664.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Referring to the THOMPSON REPORT, supra note 239, the Court observed one
Senator's remarks about the hearings. Senator Collins concluded that "the hearings provided
overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising
have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of
legal rubble." McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 652 (emphasis added).
357. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 628.
358. Id. at 685.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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determine the constitutional standard of review. Instead, the Court only permitted
Congress to enact remedies with its § 5 power. Further, using legislative record
review, the Court in Boerne retained an even greater ability to oversee Congress's
actions and yielded greater power to the Court. In this way, Congress is given some
room to enact legislation, but the Court retains decisive control to define the
meaning of law and the Constitution. Similarly, if Congress begins to go too far in
regulating campaign financing, McConnell provides the Court with a method of
keeping Congress in check without having to define a new constitutional standard.
Thus, Congress will not be allowed to regulate without first indicating to the
Court-through a record of evidence indicating corruption or the appearance of
corruption-that it has properly exercised its legislative power.
CONCLUSION
A successful legislative plan to enact future campaign finance laws, which
implicate First Amendment concerns, must include two considerations. First,
Congress can only exercise its power to regulate based upon the defined
governmental interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. To
fit within the scope of this interest, future regulations must correspond to the
definition of corruption created by the Court in Buckley and its progeny. Second,
Congress's power to regulate within these limits depends on its ability to draw a
connection between the defined interest and the evidence of corruption exhibited in
the record. The constitutionality of campaign finance laws has begun to take on an
implicit requirement to create a record justifying the enactments of the legislature.
Just as the Commerce Clause and Reconstruction Amendment cases "turn[] on the
nature of the issue triggering the legislation and the relationship of the legislative
response to the perceived need[,] ' 362 McConnell makes evident that the Court has
begun to adopt a similar form of review for campaign finance laws. By utilizing
these principles when enacting future campaign finance laws, Congress will not
overstep its Election Clause authority and the laws will likely be deemed
constitutional.
362. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 292, at 98.
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